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The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) system is designed to provide income 
security to workers in the event that health problems prevent them from working. In order 
to qualify for benefits, applicants must pass a medical screening that is intended to verify 
that the individual is truly incapable of work. Past research has shown, however, that the 
screening procedures used do not function without error. If screening were error-free, it 
has can be demonstrated that it is socially optimal to distinguish the disabled non-worker 
from the non-disabled, providing benefits to the disabled. In this paper we first 
demonstrate that if the errors in the medical screening are too large, it will not be optimal 
to distinguish the disabled from the non-disabled. Then, we use data on the actual quality 
of screening to determine first, if segmenting the non-working population is desirable, 
and second whether the current SSDI system relies too heavily on screening than is 
justified. Our preliminary conclusion is that while screening is good enough to justify 
some distinction in benefits, it may not be good enough to justify the size of the benefit 
offered. 
 
 Much of the discussion about social insurance programs centers around the question of
the generality of program coverage. Should there be many programs each with its own tar-
get population and its own rules for coverage, or should the welfare and tax bureaucracies
be combined into one super-program that accomplishes all of the society’s redistribution
and collective consumption with some sort of negative income tax program? In the history
of this literature some economists and policy-makers advocated the negative income tax as
a more eﬃcient means of redistribution. More recent work has argued that categorization,
or tagging, is more eﬃcient because it can use diﬀerent incentives for those whose deci-
sions are made diﬀerently. For example, Ellwood and Summers (1986) argue that certain
groups, like the severely disabled, have very inelastic supplies of labor, while others, like
teenagers have very elastic supplies. Since the eﬃciency losses of subsidies are smaller for
those with inelastic supply responses, it makes sense, on eﬃciency grounds to use diﬀer-
ent systems of beneﬁts and eligibility requirements for groups like these. Akerlof (1978)
presents a more formal treatment of the economics of “tagging.” If we determine that a
group of individuals has a greater need, Akerlof has shown that if we can “tag” this group,
it is optimal, in the social welfare sense, to treat these individuals diﬀerently (under his
example, a negative income tax) by giving them higher subsidies. This result only holds
when the tagging is costless and the characteristic that determines the tag is exogenous to
the individual. When the tagging is based on an endogenous characteristic, the optimality
of diﬀerential treatment becomes an empirical question. Redistributive programs can be
considered forms of social insurance when income contains random components. As such,
much of the work relevant to social programs with endogenous beneﬁciary status is done
in the context of imperfect information and the provision of insurance. Varian (1980) dis-
cusses the choice of an optimal tax system that involves trade-oﬀs of three types of eﬀects:
equity, eﬃciency, and insurance. Redistribution has the eﬀect of reducing the variance in
income, an eﬀect that is valued by risk-averse individuals. When moral hazard, adverse
1selection, and transaction costs problems make private provision of such insurance infea-
sible there may be a case to be made for public provision of insurance. Speciﬁcally, one
method of overcoming problems of adverse selection is mandatory insurance, but moral
hazard problems may exist in public as well as private provision. While Varian discusses
redistributive taxation in general, Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) discuss social insurance
speciﬁcally with regard to labor force decisions. Under several sets of assumptions, includ-
ing the existence of moral hazard, they derive the optimal provision of public insurance
against loss of earnings ability, where ability to work is treated as a dichotomous vari-
able. Those who are unable to work retire and all others choose whether to retire or
work. They ﬁnd that at the optimal level of provision, individuals are indiﬀerent between
working and not working but work when able. Like Diamond and Mirrlees, Crocker and
Snow (1986) base their optimal insurance provision on the existence of two (or some ﬁnite
number of) groups in the population which are imperfectly distinguishable from one an-
other. They ﬁnd that in private insurance markets, it is optimal to discriminate between
the groups, oﬀering diﬀerent policies based on some observable characteristic (race, sex,
etc.) when that characteristic is somehow correlated with the underlying high/low risk
distinction. However, if the observation of the intermediate characteristic is costly, there
is no unambiguous eﬃciency gain to discrimination based on that characteristic. Finally,
Shavell (1979) obtains the same result for the provision of social insurance ﬁnding that
it is possible to design a program, under moral hazard, where the usefulness of imperfect
information about the care taken by individuals to avoid loss outweighs the risks (to the
insurer) involved in using that information. This program involves either ex ante or ex
post observation1 of care taken depending on the value of imperfect information and the
number of individuals, among other things.
1 Ex ante observation is made of all covered by the insurance while ex post observation is made only
of claimants.
2The present paper attempts to answer questions of coverage in the speciﬁc case of
Disability Insurance taking into account issues raised by the authors mentioned above. In
particular, what system of incentives is most appropriate for the provision of beneﬁts to the
disabled? Given that the ﬁrst step in obtaining disability beneﬁts is the application by the
individual who reports himself as disabled, and given that observation of health status by
the government is imperfect, what program can the government design that will maximize
social welfare? Does it impose a health screen, or does it rely on low beneﬁt levels to
induce those who are able to work to remain in the labor force and provide basic support
only to those who have no labor force option? If the health screen is only partially eﬀective
in screening out the able-bodied and screening in the disabled, should the screen even be
used? If the application process is costly either for the applicant or the government, is the
program worth having? If there is some threshold level of costs, below which the program
is welfare-improving, what is that level?
The overriding goal of this paper is to examine the welfare implications of imperfect
medical screening. Stories of able-bodied applicants being awarded disability beneﬁts
and deserving applicants being denied have caused concern about both the reliability and
validity of DI screening. The designers of DI recognized the diﬃculty of distinguishing
the disabled from the able-bodied and have tried to design a screening process that can
identify the truly disabled. Intuitively, one imagines that the reliability and validity of
screening would have an impact on the design of the optimal program. This paper uses
available evidence on both the reliability and validity of medical screening to determine
how an optimal set of programs might be designed to provide income to both the disabled
and non-disabled. Given the level of imperfection in the medical screen that is used, does
it make sense to make the kinds of distinctions that exist in transfer programs between
the disabled and non-disabled?
3The Reliability and Validity of Disability Screening
The law deﬁnes disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable physical impairment expected to result in death or
last at least 12 months. The worker must be unable to do any work that exists in the
national economy for which that worker is qualiﬁed by virtue of his age, education, and
work experience.
The actual arrangement for awarding DI beneﬁts is complex. A person seeking these
beneﬁts applies for them at an oﬃce of the Social Security Administration (SSA). Once
the federal oﬃcials and the applicant have gathered suﬃcient information to complete the
application, it is submitted to a state agency for determination of disability. Disability
examiners in this oﬃce, working with the aid of vocational and medical consultants, make
the initial determination of eligibility for DI.
As a practical matter, SSA asks the state disability determination oﬃces to follow
a ﬁve-step procedure in determining disability. First, the examiners check to see if the
applicant is currently working and making more than $500.00 a month, deﬁned as the
“substantial gainful activity” amount. If so, the application is denied. Almost no cases
are rejected in this manner, since presumably the SSA ﬁeld oﬃces have already checked to
see if the applicant is working before they send the application to the disability determina-
tion oﬃce. Second, the state disability examiners determine if the applicant has a severe
impairment that is expected to last 12 months or result in death. If not, the application
is denied. About 26 percent of all applicants were denied at this step in 1994. Third, the
state disability examiners look to see if the impairment is included on a list of impairments
deﬁned as disabling by SSA. If the impairment is listed, and if it can be expected to last at
least 12 months-medical doctors hired by the state agencies help to make this decision-then
the person receives beneﬁts. If the impairment is judged to be the equivalent of one of the
listed disabling impairments, then the person also receives beneﬁts. Most recipients are
4awarded beneﬁts at this stage because their impairment either “meets” or “equals” (21
percent of all applicants in 1994) one of those on the list.
If a decision cannot be reached on medical factors alone, the applicant’s residual
functional capacity is examined, to see if the person’s impairment prevents him or her from
meeting the demands of “past relevant work.” If not, then beneﬁts are denied. About 20
percent of all applicants were denied at this step in 1994. If so, examiners determine if
the impairment prevents the applicant from doing other work. Here vocational factors are
considered. If, for example, a person’s maximum sustained work capacity is limited to
sedentary work and he is at least aged 50 to 54, with less than a high school education
and no skilled work experience, then the person would be considered disabled and given
beneﬁts. But if the person’s previous employment experience includes skilled work, then
he or she would not receive beneﬁts. At this point, 11 percent of all applicants were allowed
and 22 percent were denied in 1994.
Applicants who are denied beneﬁts can ask for a reconsideration. Their ﬁle will then
go back to a second team of examiners. Rejected on this reconsideration, an individual
may appeal the case to an administrative law judge. Here is the ﬁrst time that an applicant
will actually come face to face with the decision makers. Denied beneﬁts at this stage, an
individual may appeal the decision to the Social Security Appeals Council and then to the
District Courts.
Only a minority of claims get past the initial hearing (34 percent in 1995), with an
even smaller portion getting as far as an administrative law judge (19 percent in 1995).
Still, as the proportion of claimants who were initially denied beneﬁts rose during the late
1970s, the proportion of those who appealed also rose. The proportion of initial decisions
that were reversed also went up. For the claimants who are either allowed beneﬁts at the
initial level or who don’t appeal, the process usually takes a few months. For those who
appeal through to the administrative law judge, the process can take a year or more.
5The validity of the medical screening involved in determining DI eligibility has always
been questioned. During the 1960s the Social Security Administration commissioned sev-
eral studies to consider this issue. The most ambitious eﬀort was a study conducted by
Saad Nagi (1969). Independent panels evaluated the work potential of a sample of SSDI
applicants. These panels included doctors, psychologists, and occupational and vocational
counselors. They were authorized to enter applicants’ homes to conduct any of a variety
of tests and to collect any information they felt to be relevant to the case. Moreover, in
their deliberations they were not bound by the legal deﬁnition of disability.
The teams evaluated applicants on an eight-point continuum ranging from “ﬁt for work
under normal conditions” to “not ﬁt for work.” As reprinted in Table A.1, Nagi (1969)
compares the clinical teams’ eight-point evaluations of work capacity to the actual Social
Security Administration decisions to provide or deny beneﬁts. Somewhat surprisingly,
even among the subsample of people the clinical team judged to be nonborderline cases
there is a 30 to 40 percent disparity compared to Social Security evaluation outcomes. For
example, of those the clinical team judged to be ﬁt only for work at home, 30.5 percent had
been denied beneﬁts. Of those the clinical team judged to be ﬁt for work in speciﬁc jobs,
excluding former jobs, under normal circumstances, 36 percent received DI allowances.
Nagi (1969) pointed out the limitations of the DI screening process. He argued that
because the vast majority of its applicants suﬀer signiﬁcant health limitations, the disability
determination examiners have considerable diﬃculty distinguishing the more deserving
from the less deserving. They have particular diﬃculty in evaluating cases that involve
either multiple impairments or psychological or vocational components.
There have been substantial changes in the nature of the medical screening used to
evaluate disability insurance applicants since Nagi’s study. Not only has the Social Security
Administration made changes in the criteria used to evaluate disability applicants, but
the fraction of individuals appealing decisions substantially increased. As a result, it is
6unclear to what extent the Nagi study still applies. Still, no similar study has ever been
commissioned and so it continues to be the most reliable guide to the accuracy of the
medical screening used to evaluate applicants.
Errors in disability determination arise from a number of sources. First of all, even
with the same medical information, individuals will diﬀer in their judgments about how
debilitating a speciﬁc condition is. Even if they do not disagree about the fact they may
disagree about the right threshold. These sources of disagreement introduce elements of
test-retest error. A second source of error is introduced by whatever discrepancy there is
between disability as it is legally and administratively determine and disability as it aﬀect
labor market performance. Such discrepancies would arise if there are factors that inﬂuence
actual disability that the disability determination service fails to take into account (e.g.
unobserved components of health) or if there are factors that don’t inﬂuence actual disabil-
ity that the disability determination service does take into account (e.g. misinformation
about an applicants condition).
In evaluating the empirical evidence it will be useful to work with a simple statistical
model, in which SSA screeners consider a component of health, ψ, while Nagi screeners
consider ψ, but in addition, consider an orthogonal component, η. Both screeners have a
ﬁxed standard for disability, but both have random errors in their evaluations (κ for SSA,
ν for Nagi). Thus a DI applicant
passes SS screen if δs = ψ + κ>c (1)
passes Nagi screen if δn = ψ + η + ν>c n. (2)
We can collapse the data in table A.1 to a 2 x 2 table if we deﬁne the bottom 3
Nagi categories as passing the disability screen. Using these data we can calculate the
correlation between δs and δn, but even with one normalization, we are still left with three
7variances to calculate.
In this model, σ2
κ σ2
ν are natural measures of the reliability of the two screening
regimes. Data obtained by Gallichio and Bye (1980) can be used to get an estimate of σ2
κ.
These researchers gave diﬀerent SSA evaluators in 8 states the same set of applications,
and measured the rate of agreement between them. A simple statistical model of this
experiment would posit that an applicant in state s
passes screen 1 if δ1 = ψ + κ1 >c s (3)
passes screen 2 if δ2 = ψ + κ2 >c s. (4)
Here, we assume that σ2
κ1 = σ2
κ2 = σ2
κ. The within state estimate of the correlation
between evaluators is 0.912. If we normalize the variance of ψ to 1, this implies that
σ2
κ =0 .52. If we assume that the screening variability of the Nagi teams is roughly equal
to that of the SSA evaluators, we can identify the remaining parameters in the model.
Under these assumptions, σ2
η =0 .84. Thus, the SSA evaluators considered just over half
of the variation in the health considered by the Nagi evaluators when making disability
determinations.
However, both the GB data and the Nagi data are obtained on self-selected samples
of applicants. We can add an application decision to the model, in which a potential
applicant considers both health factors, ψ and η, and non-health factors, υ. He applies for
DI beneﬁts if
δa = ψ + η + υ>c a. (5)
While these data do not allow us to identify the relative importance of non-health
factors in the application decision, in other work (Bound, Stinebrickner, & Waidmann,
82002) we have found that about half of the decision to apply is based on factors other
than observeable health and disability. Using a trivariate probit, we can jointly estimate
the selection equation with the screening decisions. When we account for self-selection,
we estimate that the correlation between the Nagi and SSA evaluators is more like 0.64,
higher than estimated without accounting for selection, and thus the validity of screening
is higher than estimated when we ignored selection. In addition, the correlation between
SSA evaluators (and thus the reliability of screening) is also higher (.928 vs. .912) after
accounting for selectivity.
In the remainder of the paper we outline an economic model of the SSDI program that
allows us to examine the relevance of these ﬁndings for the design of the socially optimal
program.
A Model of Disability Insurance with Imperfect Screening
Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) have a model of a disability insurance program that
can help to answer some of these questions. They show that in a scheme where health
is costlessly but imperfectly observable it is still optimal to provide a DI program that
screens on the basis of health such that the probability of being accepted onto the program
increases with level of disability.2 Under such a program, those who are most able to work
do not apply for DI, some who would work otherwise apply and are accepted while others
are rejected and return to work. Still others apply, are rejected and choose to remain
out of the labor force regardless. In their model, the optimum is such that the beneﬁts
from the disability program are less than the income received by those who work but are
greater than the beneﬁts to rejected applicants who remain out of the labor force. It can be
shown, however, that if there are costs to the government of observing the health status of
applicants then the optimality of providing higher beneﬁts to those who pass a health screen
2 “Disability” and “Disutility from labor” are indistinguishable from one another.
9is ambiguous.3 Diamond and Sheshinski, therefore leave interesting empirical questions
unanswered. By allowing for individual speciﬁc costs of application and more carefully
modeling the government assessment of individual health status, the model presented here
generalizes the Diamond and Sheshinski model and develops an empirical implementation
which, we claim, helps answer some of these questions.
Assume that each individual is characterized by realizations on four random variables:
ψ This represents disutility caused by work which the Social Security Administration
calls disability. This is what the medical examiner uses in evaluating the individual’s
eligibility for Disability Insurance beneﬁts.
  This variable has several possible interpretations. It represents either disutility from
work that is unrelated to health or the component of poor health that is unobserved in
the physical examination required by SSA. Thus, while   does not enter into the SSA
decision regarding eligibility, it does enter the individual’s decision about work and is
counted in welfare calculations. In terms of the statistical model presented above, we
can think of   = η + υ.
ξ This variable represents the cost, in utility terms, of application for the individual.
This cost might be interpreted as either a monetary or a psychic cost or a combination
of both. Its monetary component may be the earnings foregone during the period of
application (working during the application process is taken as evidence of ineligibil-
ity by the Social Security Administration) or the opportunity cost of time involved
applying and undergoing medical examination.
κ We can think of this as deviation from the mean value of the disability screen used
by SSA, and could represent the examiners error in measuring “true” health. The
individual never actually knows the value of this variable, but knows its distribution,
and makes application decisions based on that knowledge.
3 See the Appendix for this result.
10The Individual’s Problem
Based on an individual’s realization of the ﬁrst three random variables, he decides
whether or not to apply for disability beneﬁts. If he decides not to apply or applies and
is rejected, he must decide whether or not to work. If the individual does not work and
does not receive disability beneﬁts, he receives beneﬁts from a program that has no health
criteria for its beneﬁciaries. We model the application and work decisions as follows. Each
of the three states of the world has its own level of consumption. Workers receive Ca;D I
recipients receive Cd; and the rest receive Cb.4 In utility terms, a non-applicant has utility
U
na =m a x {v(Cb),v(Ca) − θ} (6)
where θ =e x p {ψ+ } and v(·) is a function such that v (·) > 0a n dv  (·) < 0. An applicant
who is accepted has utility
Udi = v(Cd) − ξ (7)
while an applicant who is rejected has utility
Urej =m a x {v(Cb),v(Ca) − θ}−ξ. (8)
As discussed above, the individual does not know the value of κ that will apply in his
particular case, but based on his knowledge of its distribution, he knows
Prob(Application Accepted|ψ,ακ)=P r o b ( ψ>κ |ακ)=P(ψ,ακ)(9 )
where ακ is the vector of distributional parameters for κ. We can now write the following
decision rules. First, notice that equations (6) and (8) imply that the work/non-work
decision is the same for non-applicants and rejected applicants, i.e.,
4 Cb might be thought of as the combination of alternative sources of income for those rejected by SSA
and remaining out of the labor force. These might include veterans’beneﬁts, general assistance, etc.
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w ≡ v(Ca) − θ − ξ>v (Cb) − ξ ≡ U
rej
nw .
Thus, a person can be classiﬁed as a “worker” iﬀ
v(Ca) − θ ≥ v(Cb), or
ψ ≤ ln(v(Ca) − v(Cb)) −   ≡ ψ
∗( ). (10)




P(ψ,ακ)Udi +(1 − P(ψ,ακ))Urej
w if ψ ≤ ψ∗( ),
P(ψ,ακ)Udi +(1 − P(ψ,ακ))Urej
nw if ψ>ψ ∗( ).
(11)





w if ψ ≤ ψ∗( ),
Una
nw if ψ>ψ ∗( ). (12)
Then, an individual will apply for DI iﬀ EUa >U na. For “workers,” this condition is
(assuming ξ>0)
ξ<P(ψ,ακ)[v(Cd) − v(Ca)+e x p {ψ +  }] ≡ ξw, (13)
and for non-workers, this condition is
ξ<P(ψ,ακ)[v(Cd) − v(Cb)] ≡ ξnw. (14)
Equations (10), (13) and (14) thus deﬁne the decision rules for every individual in the
population.
12The Government’s Problem
There are several possible characterizations of the government’s choice of the optimal
program. One approach is to maximize the expected utility of an individual who knows
only the distributions of the random variables described above, and behaves according to
the model above. When working the individual pays the taxes that fund the program
and when not working, he receives beneﬁts according to the government’s perception of
his health. This approach has intuitive appeal because it approximates the choice of an
insurance policy that this hypothetical individual makes subject to the constraint that the
expected value of his or her output equal the expected payments made by the insurance
policy. This concept of the optimal program is problematic, however, when we consider
t h en a t u r eo f  and ψ. To the individual these two quantities are equivalent, and the opti-
mal insurance policy (from the perspective of the individual) should protect consumption
equally from high values of either. To the extent that   represents non-health disutility,
political constraints, among other things, might lead policy-makers to treat variation in
this variable diﬀerently from variation in disutility that can be clearly classiﬁed as health-
related.
Given that the policy maker desires to distinguish between health-related and non-
health disutility, a medical screen is a natural way to make that distinction. The presence of
a screening process induces individuals to treat the two forms of disutility diﬀerently in the
application decision, since high values of   will not increase the probability of acceptance
as will high values of ψ. The policy maker then has two potential instruments to use in
designing the optimal set of program, the stringency of the screen and the generosity of
disability beneﬁts relative to non-disability beneﬁts. The optimality of having a screen
in the presence of imperfect health information and a costly application process, as we
will see, depends on the quality of the screening mechanism. For the “representative”
individual, a more stringent screening mechanism beneﬁts the working state while a less
13stringent screen beneﬁts the non-working states. The policy maker’s task is to ﬁnd the
appropriate balance between these possible states, and determine levels of income in the
non-working states that provide adequate insurance against lost earnings.
Hence, assume that the government, knowing the joint distribution of the three ran-
dom variables that characterize each individual, seeks to set beneﬁt levels in both the
health-screened program and the non-screened program and the mean standard for health-
screening to maximize the expected utility of this “representative” individual who knows
nothing but these distributions. The government is subject to a resource constraint such
that the total consumption of the population equals the output produced by those who
work. For simplicity assume that each person who works is equally productive and pro-









(C( ,ψ,ξ,Ω)− Y ( ,ψ,ξ,Ω))f( ,ψ,ξ)dξdψd 
(15)
where Ω ≡ (Ca,C b,C d, ¯ κ) is the vector of program parameters, C(·)andY (·) are the levels of
consumption and output, respectively, determined by program parameters and realizations
of  , ψ andξ. Then if we deﬁne the domains of the variables as
 , ψ ∈ (−∞,∞)a n dξ ∈ (0,∞),











































































We claim that introducing costs of application produces a similar result to the in-
troduction of costs of screening. It can be shown (see Appendix) that in a model where
health is not perfectly observable, a system that screens applicants on observable health
and pays them higher beneﬁts is optimal when costs of screening are zero; however, the
introduction of costs of screening make this optimality ambiguous. In this case, we assert
that the ambiguity also arises if the applicant bears the costs instead of the government.
Intuitively, when the applicant bears the cost of screening, the government must increase
the beneﬁt paid to keep marginal utilities equal across contingencies; therefore the gov-
ernment bears a cost and the same results hold. Once we have this result, the optimality
of disability insurance becomes an empirical question. If some level of cost is low enough
that a separate program is still beneﬁcial, does the population have a cost of application
that lies below that critical level? More precisely, if we assume that there is a continuum
15of costs in the population, do the existence of low costs for some justify the existence of
a separate program? In what follows we propose a method using knowledge of aggregate
behavior to calibrate the model of individual behavior described above and determine dis-
tributional parameters for the population. These values can then be substituted into the
set of ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for an interior optimum to determine the parameters,
Ω∗, of the optimal program.
Besides allowing us to characterize the optimal program, knowing the structural pa-
rameters of the model allows us to examine some comparative statics results implied by
the model. These results serve as both answers to substantive questions and checks on the
validity of the model in describing behavior. For example, how would the proportion of the
population participating in the labor force change with a balanced-budget change in Cd?
¯ κ? Or, what proportion of those on DI would be working if the program did not exist? It
should also be interesting to see how the functional form v(·) aﬀects the parameter values,
optimal program parameters and the above comparative statics results. How does more
risk aversion in the utility function aﬀect the generosity of programs?
Calibration of the Model
To actually obtain values for the distributional parameters, we must impose more
structure on the model. In particular, we must specify a functional form for the utility
function v(·), the density functions for ψ, ,ξ, and κ, and the function P(·). To begin, we









lnξ ∼ N(¯ ηξ,σ2
ηξ) (20)
κ ∼ N(¯ κ,σ2
κ) (21)
Note that (13) –(21) imply ﬁrst that
P(ψ,ακ)=Φ
	



















where Φ(·)andφ(·) are the cumulative standard normal distribution and the standard
normal density functions, respectively, and second that any joint density function involving
two or three variables can be written as the product of marginal density functions.
To get an idea of what these distributional parameters look like we make use of the
following observations. We assume that replacement ratios for DI recipients are 60%5 and
for non-recipients are 40%.6 That is,
Cd = .6Ca and Cb = .4Ca (23)
These ratios, and the rest of our assumptions, can be varied to test the sensitivity of
the structural parameters to those assumptions.
For the purposes of calibration, we begin by assuming that
5 See Lando, et. al.(1982). This ratio corresponds to the ratio of average income under DI to average
income for an individual in the labor market in 1975.
6 Based on our tabulations from the 1972 Survey of the Disabled. Comparing income received by
disabled non-workers who did not receive DI with income received by DI recipients, we ﬁnd a ratio
of 2




















and will vary these assumptions over a range consistent with the estimates derived above.
These assumptions leave us with six unknowns: ¯  ,σ , ¯ ηξ,σ ηξ, ¯ κ, and Ca.T h e r e s u l t s o f
past empirical work can be used to help determine these numbers. We wish to ﬁnd values
of the unknowns which are consistent, given our model, with these empirical observations
of the Disability Insurance program. First assume that the proportion of the population
that works (of men 45-64) is 0.876.7. Assume that the proportion of this age group that
applies for DI is 0.1368 and that the probability of acceptance conditional on application
is 0.509. The elasticity of applications with respect to generosity of beneﬁts has been
estimated at 0.5010, and the elasticity of applications with respect to the conditional (on
application) probability of acceptance has been estimated at 0.80.11 Finally, we assume
that the internal budget of the combined disability/welfare program balances for the age
group in question. Then we can get a system of six equations in the six unknowns. These
equations will set the hypothesized numbers above equal to the analytical expressions for
the corresponding numbers in the model and as such will be of the form
Proportion working = 0.876 = πw((¯  ,σ , ¯ ηξ,σ ηξ, ¯ κ,Ca)) (25)
Proportion applying = 0.136 = πapp((¯  ,σ , ¯ ηξ,σ ηξ, ¯ κ,Ca)) (26)
Conditional acceptance probability = 0.50 = πacc|app((¯  ,σ , ¯ ηξ,σ ηξ, ¯ κ,Ca)) (27)
7 We will calibrate the model with assumptions based on 1975 observations. For this number see
Bureau of Labor Statistics(1986).
8 Social Security Administration(1987).
9 Lando, et. al.(1982) give this number for applicants of all ages.
10 Halpern(1979) based on time-series regressions of applications on beneﬁt levels.
11 Marvel(1982) using pooled cross section time series state data where some states tightened require-
ments under federal pressure over the period studied. Estimates are based on within-state ﬁrst-
diﬀerences.
18Beneﬁt elasticity of applications = 0.50 = ρπapp,Cd((¯  ,σ , ¯ ηξ,σ ηξ, ¯ κ,Ca)) (28)
Probability elasticity of applications = 0.80 = ρπapp,πacc|app((¯  ,σ , ¯ ηξ,σ ηξ, ¯ κ,Ca)) (29)
Program Budget Deﬁcit = 0 = D((¯  ,σ , ¯ ηξ,σ ηξ, ¯ κ,Ca)) (30)
The six equation system can be reduced to a ﬁve equation system by substituting
through the budget constraint which, at the solution, satisﬁes
πw(Ca − 1) + πacc|appπapp(.6Ca)+(1 − πw − πacc|appπapp)(.4Ca)=0 . (31)







While there is no guarantee that a system of non-linear equations with as many
equations as unknowns will have a unique solution (if it has any), if we believe that this
model is correct then the existence of a solution in the real-world should give us faith that
one exists in the model. This concern may be moot, however, because it turns out that
the model does have a solution which seems reasonable given its structure.12 Table 1 gives














The direction of change in the parameter values with diﬀerent levels of risk-aversion and
screening validity and reliability seem to make sense.
[Table 1 here]
As the assumed level of risk aversion goes up, in order for the observed level of labor
force participation and DI application to remain the same, we would expect to have lower
levels of unobserved disability, higher levels of application costs, and lower expectations of
acceptance for DI applicants since higher levels of risk aversion lead to lower thresholds
for DI application, other things equal. All of these expectations are borne out in the
calibrations reported in table 1.
12 The system is solved numerically using Broyden’s secant method for non-linear equations.
19When we vary the parameter representing screening reliability, the structural parame-
ters behave as expected. With higher assumed levels of screening reliability (lower relative
variance in the disability threshold), those with marginal levels of observed disability will
be less likely to apply. To keep participation and application rates constant, we would
expect either a lower average threshold in the disability determination process, a lower
average level of application costs, or higher levels of unobserved disability. Each of these
is seen when we vary the assumed reliability of the screening process.
When we vary the parameter representing screening validity (by changing the variance
of observed disability relative to the variance of total disability), we get a diﬀerent story.
We would expect that several forces are operative in the calibration results. First, an
increase in the variance of observed disability (while the mean of observed disability is
assumed to be constant) will mean an increase in the numbers of individuals qualifying
to be disabled. In order for participation, application and acceptance rates to remain
constant, there might be a decrease in unobserved disability, a higher threshold level of
disability in the disability determination process, or a higher mean level of application costs.
However, a higher variance in observed disability also implies a lower level of sensitivity
in the application process to beneﬁt levels and acceptance probabilities. If application
elasticities are to remain constant, we might expect higher levels of unobserved disability
or lower threshold levels of disability in the determination process. As we see when we
vary the validity parameter in the range from 0.33 to 0.50, the structural parameters move
in both directions.
For each of the cases reported in table 1, we then numerically solve the system of
ﬁrst order conditions corresponding to the maximization problem given in (11). The ﬁrst
four rows of each panel give the values of the program parameters with respect to which
the optimization is performed. The table indicates that the optimal levels of income
replacement are higher for larger values of the risk aversion parameter, as individuals
20are willing to forego more in taxes collected from the working state to insure against lost
consumption in the non-working states. Compared to current levels of income replacement
in both the DI system and in alternative transfer systems, the optimal rates of replacement
are often considerably larger.
[Table 2 here]
Values of the disability threshold are also presented in this table, but without knowl-
edge of the underlying distribution of disability and the other structural parameters, it is
impossible to know what happens to acceptance rates. Thus, in the next section of the
table, we present simulated values for the population’s DI application rate, the conditional
acceptance rate and the labor force participation rate. These indicate that while transfer
programs are more generous at the optimum, application rates for disability insurance are
not much larger, most probably due to the relatively large increase in the generosity of
non-DI transfer income. Hence, application costs must be large enough to discourage many
of the non-working non-disabled (as deﬁned by the observed disability level) from apply-
ing for DI beneﬁts. At high levels of risk aversion the presence of large application costs
apparently begins to drive down application rates. For example, if the disability screen
captures half of the variance in work disutility (validity parameter=0.5), the level of the
screen (as implied by the observed application rates) is very high. In this scenario, high
levels of risk aversion combined with high implied application costs produce an optimal
program in which the DI program becomes unimportant. Application costs are too high,
and the utility gain in receiving DI beneﬁts is too low to justify any applications to the
program. The same trend is evident, though less dramatic, at higher levels of risk aversion
under other assumptions about the validity of screening.
Labor force participation rates are in general lower at the optimum than those we
observe, but as the next two lines in the tables indicate, a much smaller fraction of the DI
recipient population under the optimal program who would be working if they were not
21receiving DI. The optimal program apparently provides an income alternative for those
with high levels of work-disutility but who would fail to qualify for DI beneﬁts. Combined
with apparently considerable costs of application, this generous alternative produces an
apparently more self-selected group of applicants. Under the assumption, however, that the
screening process is less reliable (reliability parameter=0.25), the improved self-selection
of the applicant pool disappears. Conversely under the assumption that screening is more
reliable, the improvement in self-selection is apparently larger.
Finally, table 2 presents a utility comparison of the current and optimal program
under each set of assumptions. In addition to calculating the level of utility under both
the optimal and current programs, we also calculate the fraction of income necessary to
compensate a person facing the optimal program in order to make him/her indiﬀerent be-
tween the optimal program and the current program. We exploit the feature of constrained
optimization problems that the value of the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum is equal
to the marginal utility of income. Then, we can get a rough idea of the value of the util-
ity diﬀerence by dividing the diﬀerence in utility by the value of the Lagrange multiplier.
These calculations indicate that the current and optimal programs are much farther apart
in value to the representative agent if the agent’s level of risk aversion is large. At low
levels of risk aversion such as g=1.5, having the optimal program is only worth about 1%
of a representative individual’s income, but at higher levels, the optimal program may be
worth up to 15% of that individual’s income.
Another set of simulations not reported here can be used to get an idea of the beneﬁts
of improving the screening process. For example, in calculating the parameters of the
optimal program from the implied values of the structural parameters, we could simulate an
improvement in the reliability parameter. Such a simulation indeed produces an expected
utility gain for the population, though of a fairly small magnitude. Assuming a risk aversion
parameter of 0.3, and a validity parameter of 0.33, a 25% reduction in the relative variance
22of the disability screen (an increase in the implied rate of agreement between independent
disability evaluators from 83% to 87%) produces a utility gain worth less than 0.02% of the
average individual’s income. Whether this screening improvement is worthwhile depends
on whether the cost of achieving a more reliable system is smaller or larger than the beneﬁt
summed over the entire population.
Discussion
Some Preliminary Conclusions
Given the model of disability insurance formulated above, and results of past empir-
ical work on DI, we have shown that it is optimal, under plausible conditions, to have
a program like DI that targets a segment of the population considered to have special
need and smaller-than-average elasticities of labor supply, and gives them higher-than-
average transfer payments. The group is tagged using observable health as an imperfect
measure of ability to work. Even if the process involves costs to both beneﬁciaries and non-
beneﬁciaries, it is still optimal to use this process to categorize the population. However,
the structure of the optimal program varies considerably with the assumptions we make
about information quality. While this variability makes concrete policy recommendations
on stringency diﬃcult, it is fairly clear that the consumption advantage experienced by
applicants who pass the health screen over those who do not is larger than optimal re-
gardless of the quality of information. If the levels of risk aversion used in determining the
optimal program approximate the risk aversion in the population, rejected DI applicants
and other non-workers suﬀer ineﬃciently large losses in income under the current beneﬁt
structure.
A central point of this paper is to understand the welfare implications of imperfect
screening. These results allow us to make several preliminary conclusions. First, with
the implied levels of application costs, the observed levels of imperfection in the screening
23process are not large enough to eliminate the utility gain from having a two-tiered transfer
system. However, they do imply that the current system probably relies too heavily on
this medical screening. Second, improvements in the screening process would produce
beneﬁts for the population. Whether doing so is desirable obviously depends on the costs
of those improvements.
Directions For Ongoing Research
These conclusions are preliminary, as several areas of the research reported here are
currently being reﬁned. The results obtained after these modiﬁcations are made will serve
as a test of the robustness of the preliminary ﬁndings. First, the data used here are largely
obtained from the 1970s. The SSA has linked data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation with administrative data on SSDI applicants. These can be used to obtain
more recent estimates of the fraction of the population applying for beneﬁts, the fraction
allowed, and the fraction of non-applicants and denied applicants who participate in the
labor force. These changes will largely require recalibrating the model and re-estimating
optimal program parameters.
Second, the model described above is a static model, in that the award decision and
beneﬁt receipt is assumed to be instantaneous. The SSDI program has a built-in waiting
period for recieving beneﬁts after the determination is made that an individual is disabled.
During the waiting period, the successful applicant will not have been working. Thus, we
are incorporating a waiting period into the model, during which applicants will only be
able to consume what non-working persons who aren’t receiving DI beneﬁts can consume
(Cb). In addition, the random application costs, ξ, like the monetary cost of reduced
income, are assumed to be limited in time to the waiting period. This change necessitates
the introduction of discounting for both cash ﬂows and future utility.
Third, the government problem we present here seeks the parameters of the DI and
non-DI transfer system that balance the budget and maximize the welfare of the entire
24population. It is perhaps more appropriate to think of the goal of the programs to maximize
the value of the program to the population with some limitation on their ability to work.
Thus, in calculating our benchmarks and in maximizing social welfare, we will conﬁne
ourselves to the 15 to 20 percent of the working age population who have some limitation.
Finally, we will add to the simulation exercise a calculation of the optimal program
parameters under two extreme cases. The ﬁrst of these is the case of perfect information.
Here, individuals know with certainty whether or not they will be awarded beneﬁts, so
only those who qualify will bother to apply. The optimal policy will provide two levels of
beneﬁts. In fact, the optimal disability beneﬁt should completely replace lost income from
work, as well as reimburse individuals for any costs in application. The other extreme case
is one in which there is no information contained in the SSA screening, i.e., awards are
distributed randomly. In this case, the optimal program will presumably not distinguish
between persons who pass the screen and persons who do. We can then compare the
optimal programs in the extreme cases with the optimal program under the imperfect
information case as we observe it. While two levels of beneﬁts emerge in this case, they
are presumably closer in magnitude than they would be in the perfect information case.
The three-way comparison will give a broad picture of the implication of screening quality
on optimal program design.
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27Table 1: Calibration of Disability Insurance Application/Acceptance Model
reliability 
parameter 0.20 0.20 0.20
validity 




parameter 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
mean 
(unobs. 
disability) -5.18 -5.86 -6.65 -7.57 -8.60 -4.90 -5.29 -5.79 -6.40 -7.10 -7.49 -8.23 -8.84 -9.56
mean 
(app.cost) -5.84 -5.45 -5.05 -4.66 -4.27 -5.59 -5.18 -4.78 -4.37 -3.97 -5.23 -4.82 -4.40 -3.98
disability 
screen 3.71 4.38 5.14 6.01 6.97 3.68 4.14 4.70 5.36 6.11 7.11 7.96 8.62 9.41
s.d. 
(unobs. 
disability) 3.68 4.34 5.10 5.95 6.90 3.29 3.73 4.25 4.85 5.52 4.77 5.39 5.93 6.55
s.d. 

























parameter 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
mean 
(unobs. 
disability) -4.23 -4.69 -5.24 -5.89 -6.65 -6.61 -7.67 -8.92 -10.35
mean 
(app.cost) -6.15 -5.76 -5.37 -4.98 -4.58 -5.43 -5.05 -4.66 -4.26
disability 
screen 2.79 3.27 3.81 4.43 5.13 5.38 6.44 7.65 9.04
s.d. 
(unobs. 
disability) 2.97 3.48 4.06 4.72 5.47 4.90 5.85 6.93 8.17
s.d. 

















?Table 2: Characteristics of the Optimal Disability Insurance Program
Reliability Parameter 0.20 0.20 0.20
Validity Parameter 0.33 0.40 0.50
Risk Aversion Parameter 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Parameters of Optimal Program
  After-tax consumption rate (cf. 0.93) 0.903 0.887 0.874 0.865 0.859 0.903 0.887 0.874 0.864 0.856 0.884 0.874 0.867 0.860
  Welfare replacement rate (cf. 0.4) 0.584 0.625 0.670 0.731 0.761 0.579 0.630 0.674 0.712 0.743 0.659 0.718 0.764 0.788
  DI replacement rate (cf. 0.6) 0.643 0.692 0.741 0.784 0.810 0.658 0.710 0.750 0.779 0.803 0.747 0.805 0.805 0.813
  Disability Threshhold 2.39 1.24 1.51 3.97 4.24 3.28 3.41 3.73 4.01 4.28 5.02 8.41 21.93 27.80
Simulated population rates under optimal program
  Application Rate (cf. 0.136) 0.108 0.120 0.139 0.137 0.134 0.111 0.122 0.134 0.139 0.138 0.123 0.108 0.001 0.000
  DI Acceptance Rate (cf. 0.5) 0.524 0.669 0.686 0.613 0.644 0.473 0.510 0.559 0.608 0.644 0.525 0.440 0.165 0.041
  LF Participation Rate (cf. 0.876) 0.850 0.840 0.833 0.829 0.826 0.850 0.839 0.831 0.825 0.821 0.844 0.838 0.832 0.829
Expected Utility
  under current program -2.25 -1.29 -1.01 -0.93 -0.95 -2.25 -1.29 -1.02 -0.93 -0.95 -1.29 -1.02 -0.95 -0.99
  under optimal program -2.23 -1.25 -0.93 -0.77 -0.68 -2.23 -1.25 -0.94 -0.79 -0.70 -1.23 -0.90 -0.75 -0.67
Willingness to pay for optimal 
program (as portion of income) 1.2% 2.8% 5.5% 9.3% 13.9% 1.1% 2.7% 5.2% 8.4% 12.7% 4.6% 7.9% 11.8% 17.0%
Fraction of DI recipients who would be working otherwise
  under current program 0.144 0.143 0.141 0.140 0.138 0.120 0.123 0.125 0.126 0.126 0.076 0.079 0.084 0.088
  under optimal program 0.066 0.089 0.081 0.038 0.034 0.074 0.076 0.065 0.052 0.045 0.073 0.043 0.001 0.000Table 2 (cont): Characteristics of the Optimal Disability Insurance Program
Reliability Parameter 0.15 0.25
Validity Parameter 0.33 0.33
Risk Aversion Parameter 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Parameters of Optimal Program
  After-tax consumption rate (cf. 0.93) 0.908 0.890 0.876 0.865 0.857 0.882 0.870 0.861 0.860
  Welfare replacement rate (cf. 0.4) 0.564 0.623 0.667 0.704 0.736 0.656 0.690 0.706 0.781
  DI replacement rate (cf. 0.6) 0.627 0.678 0.724 0.761 0.789 0.738 0.783 0.816 0.825
  Disability Threshhold 2.58 2.54 2.67 2.90 3.11 3.40 3.10 2.33 6.35
Simulated population rates under optimal program
  Application Rate (cf. 0.136) 0.120 0.121 0.126 0.135 0.144 0.108 0.124 0.130 0.117
  DI Acceptance Rate (cf. 0.5) 0.523 0.544 0.568 0.604 0.655 0.404 0.491 0.601 0.579
  LF Participation Rate (cf. 0.876) 0.852 0.839 0.830 0.824 0.820 0.840 0.835 0.831 0.831
Expected Utility
  under current program -2.27 -1.31 -1.05 -0.97 -1.01 -1.28 -1.01 -0.92 -0.94
  under optimal program -2.24 -1.26 -0.95 -0.80 -0.71 -1.24 -0.92 -0.77 -0.67
Willingness to pay for optimal 
program (as portion of income) 2.0% 3.7% 6.4% 10.1% 15.2% 2.9% 5.4% 8.7% 14.8%
Fraction of DI recipients who would be working otherwise
  under current program 0.241 0.242 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.111 0.108 0.106 0.103
  under optimal program 0.051 0.058 0.062 0.059 0.049 0.110 0.115 0.134 0.025Work Capacity
1
Number Percent Number Percent Number Category Pct
Fit for work under normal conditions 9 100.0 0 0.0 9 0.4
Fit for specific jobs, including former job, 
under normal condtions
142 86.1 23 13.9 165 6.7
Fit for specific jobs, excluding former job, 
under normal condtions
167 64.0 94 36.0 261 10.6
Fit for work under special conditions 90 49.5 92 50.5 182 7.4
Can work part-time under normal 
conditions
84 50.6 82 49.4 166 6.8
Can work under sheltered conditions 87 39.4 134 60.6 221 9.0
Can work at home only 29 30.5 66 69.5 95 3.9
Not fit for work 336 24.8 1019 75.2 1355 55.2
Total 944 38.5 1510 61.5 2454 100.0
Notes: 1. Clinical Teams' Evaluations of Work Capacity.  2. Final SSDI Determinations.
Source: Reprinted from Nagi (1969), p. 94.
Table A.1 Validity of SSDI Screening
Final Determinations
2
Denied Allowed TotalState Probability Accepted











Source: Gallichio & Bye, 1980
Table A.2 Reliability of SSDI Screening